Abstract. The aim of logic is to characterize the forms of reasoning that lead invariably from true sentences to true sentences, independently of the subject matter; thus its concerns combine semantical and inferential notions in an essential way. Up to now most proposed characterizations of logicality of sentence generating operations have been given either in semantical or inferential terms. This paper offers a combined semantical and inferential criterion for logicality (improving one originally proposed by Jeffery Zucker) and shows that the quantifiers that are logical according to that criterion are exactly those definable in first order logic.
on the other, stemming from Gentzen (1936 , in his Collected Papers 1969 and pursued by Prawitz (1965 and on) even though on the face of it a combination of the two is required.
2 What is offered here is such a combined criterion for quantifiers, whose semantical part is provided by Lindström's (1966) generalization of quantifiers, and whose inferential part is closely related to one proposed by Zucker (1978) 3 . On the basis of this criterion it is shown that the quantifiers to be counted as logical are exactly those definable in classical first order logic (FOL). In addition, part of the proof idea is the same as that provided by Zucker, but his proof itself is defective in at least one essential respect that will be explained below; fixing that up is my main contribution here in addition to elaborating the criterion for logicality.
One basic conceptual difference that I have with Zucker is that he regards the meaning of a quantifier to be given by some axioms and rules of inference, provided those uniquely determine it on an inferential basis, whereas I assume that its meaning is specified semantically; that is the viewpoint both of workers in model-theoretic logics (cf. Barwise and Feferman 1985) and of workers on quantifiers in natural language (cf. Peters and Westerstahl 2006) . For Zucker's point of view, see the Appendix below.
Given a non-empty universe of discourse U and k ≥ 1, a k-ary relation on U is simply a subset P of U k ; we may also identify such with k-ary 2 Some further contributions to the semantical approach are Sher (1991) and McGee (1996) , and to the inferential approach is Hacking (1979) . I have critiqued the semantical approach in terms of set-theoretical criteria in Feferman (2000 Feferman ( , 2010 where, in conclusion, I called for a search for combined criteria. 3 An unjustly neglected paper.
"propositional" functions P: U k →{t, f}, where t and f are the truth values for truth and falsity, respectively. P(x 1 ,…,x k ) may thus be read as "P holds of (x 1 ,…,x k )" or as "P(x 1 ,…,x k ) is true."
Q is called a (global) quantifier of type ⟨k 1 ,…,k n ⟩ if Q is a class of relational structures of signature ⟨k 1 ,…,k n ⟩ closed under isomorphism. A typical member of Q is of the form ⟨U,P 1 ,…,P n ⟩ where U is non-empty and P i is a k i -ary relation on U. Given Q, with each U is associated the (local) quantifier Q U on U which is the relation Q U (P 1 ,…,P n ) that holds between P 1 ,…,P n just in case ⟨U,P 1 ,…,P n ⟩ is in Q. Alternatively we may identify Q U with the associated functional from propositional functions of the given arities on U to {t,f}.
Examples of such quantifiers given in set-theoretical terms without restriction. Common examples are the uncountability quantifier of type ⟨1⟩, the equi-cardinality quantifier of type ⟨1⟩, and the "most" quantifier of type ⟨1, 1⟩. Even though the definitions of those refer to the totality of relations of a certain sort (namely 1-1 functions), all quantifiers in Lindström's sense satisfy the following principle:
Locality Principle. Whether or not Q U (P 1 ,…,P n ) is true depends only on U and P 1 ,…,P n , and not on what sets and relations exist in general over U.
We move next to the inferential role of quantifiers. The first aspect of that, following Lindström, is purely syntactical. Given any first-order language L with some specified vocabulary of relations, functions and constant symbols, we may add Q as a formal symbol to be used as a new 4 constructor of formulas φ from given formulas ψ i , 1= 1,…,n. For each i, let x i be a k i -ary sequence of distinct variables such that x i and x j are disjoint when i ≠ j, and let y be a sequence of distinct variables disjoint from all the x i . The syntactical construction associated with Q takes the form φ(y) = Qx 1 …x n (ψ 1 (x 1 ,y),…,ψ n (x n ,y))
where the x i are all bound and the free variables of φ are just those in y. The satisfaction relation for such in a given L model M is defined recursively: for an assignment b to y in U, φ(b) is true in M iff (U, P 1 ,…,P n ) is in Q for P i taken to be the set of k i tuples a i satisfying
Now what is needed to bring inferential considerations into play is to explain which quantifiers have axioms and rules of inference that completely govern its forms of reasoning. It is here that we connect up with the inferential viewpoint, beginning with Gentzen. Remarkably, he showed how prima facie complete inferential forms could be provided separately for each of the first-order connectives and quantifiers, whether thought of constructively or classically, via the Introduction and Elimination Rules in the calculi NJ and NK, resp., of natural deduction. In addition, he first formulated the idea that the meaning of each of these operations is given by their characteristic inferences. Actually, Gentzen claimed more: he wrote that "the [Introduction rules] represent, as it were, the 'definitions' of the symbols concerned." (Gentzen 1969, p. 80) . Prawitz put teeth into this by means of his Inversion Principle (Prawitz 1965, p. 33) : namely, it follows from his normalization theorems for NJ and NK that the Elimination rule for a given operation in either calculus can be recovered from its Introduction rule when that is the last step in a normal derivation.
As I have stated above, in my view the meaning of given connectives and quantifiers is to be established semantically in one way or another prior to their inferential role. Their meanings may be the primitives of our reasoning in general⎯"and", "or", "not", "if…then", "all", "some"⎯or they may be understood informally like "most", "has the same number as", etc.
in a way that may be explained precisely in basic mathematical terms. 4 That unicity will be a key part of our criterion for logicality in general.
To illustrate, since I will be dealing here only with classical truth functional semantics, I consider schematic axioms and rules of inference for sequents Γ ⊦ Δ as in LK, but in the case of each connective or quantifier,
show only those formulas in Γ and Δ directly needed to characterize the operation in question. That may include possible additional side formulas (or parameters), to which all further formulas can be adjoined by thinning.
In LK, the Right and Left Introduction Rules take the place of the Introduction and Elimination Rules, resp., in NK. I shall also consider corresponding Hilbert-style axioms and rules.
Consider for illustrative purposes the (axioms and) rules for → and ∀. For notational simplicity, ⇒ is used for inference from one or more sequents as hypotheses, to a sequent as conclusion.
Given an operation →′ satisfying the same rules as for → we can infer from the left rule p→q, p ⊦ q the conclusion p→q ⊦ p→′q by the substitution of p→q for r in (R→′); the reverse holds by symmetry. In the case of the universal quantifier, given ∀′ that satisfies the same rules as ∀, we can derive ∀x p(x) ⊦ ∀′x p(x) by substituting ∀x p(x) for r in (R∀′). What is crucial in these proofs of uniqueness is the use of substitution of the principal formula (p→q and ∀x p(x) and their ′ versions, resp.) for a side formula (parameter) r.
If we accept → as a basic fully understood operator, we can pass to the Hilbert-style axioms and rules for the universal quantifier by simply replacing the turnstile symbol by '→', as follows:
Then in a suitable metatheory for axioms and rules in which we take all the connectives and quantifiers of FOL for granted, we can represent this rule and axiom by the following single statement in which we treat universal quantification as a quantifier Q of type ⟨1⟩:
where 'r' ranges over arbitrary propositions and 'p' over arbitrary unary predicates. Then, as above, we easily show that
Our question now is: Which quantifiers Q in general have formal axioms and rules of inference that completely characterize it in the same way as for universal quantification? The answer to that will initially be treated via a second-order language L 2 of individuals, propositions and predicates, without and then with a symbol for Q.
L 2 is specified as follows: Next, models M 2 of L 2 are specified as follows:
(i) Individual variables range over a non-empty universe U
(ii) Propositional variables range over {t, f} where t ≠ f.
(iii) Predicate variables of k arguments range over Pred (k) 
Clause (iii) is in accord with the Locality Principle, according to which predicate variables may be taken to range over any subset of the totality of k-ary relations on U.
Satisfaction of a formula φ of L 2 in M 2 at an assignment σ to all
, is defined inductively as follows:
Satisfaction is defined inductively as usual for formulas built up by ¬, ∧,→, ∀ , given the specified ranges in (ii) and (iii) for the propositional and predicate variables when it comes to quantification. Now, given a quantifier Q of arity ⟨k 1 ,…,k n ⟩. , the language L 2 (Q) adjoins a corresponding symbol Q to L 2 . This is used to form propositional terms Q(p 1 ,…,p n ) where p i is a k i -ary variable. Each such term is then also counted as an atomic formula of L 2 (Q), with formulas in general generated
Axioms and rules for a quantifier Q as in LK can now be formulated directly by a sentence A(Q) in the language L 2 (Q), as was done above for the universal quantifier, by using the associated Hilbert-style rules as an where p, q, r, … are all the propositional and predicate variables that appear in any of the B j . Now the criterion for accepting a quantifier Q given by such rules is that they implicitly define Q U in each model of A(Q) (more precisely, the restriction of Q U to the predicates of the model).
We need not restrict to such specific descriptions of axioms and rules of inference for a global quantifier Q in formulating the following general criterion for acceptance of Q as logical. NB. One should be careful to distinguish completeness of a system of axioms in the usual sense from completeness of a sentence A(Q) expressing formal axioms and rules of a quantifier Q in the sense that it meets this criterion. For example, let Q α be the type ⟨1⟩ quantifier which holds of a subset P of U just in case P is of cardinality at least ‫א‬ α . Keisler (1970) has proved completeness of a system of axioms for first-order logic extended by Q 1 . But it is easily seen that those same axioms are satisfied by Q α for any α > 1 (cf. ibid, p. 29). Hence a sentence A(Q) formally expressing Keisler's axioms does not meet the above criterion.
Semantical-Inferential Criterion for
Main Theorem. Suppose Q is a logical quantifier according to the preceding criterion. Then Q is equivalent to a quantifier defined in FOL.
The sketched proof of the related theorem in Zucker (1978) pp. 526 ff makes use of a different second order language than here, and claims to apply Beth's definability theorem to obtain an equivalence of Q with a formula in FOL. The first problem with that is the question of the applicability of Beth's theorem to a second-order language. That may be possible for certain languages such as L 2 whose semantics is not the "standard" one but rather is "Henkin" or "general". So far as I know a Beth theorem for such has not been established in the literature, even though that is quite plausible. In order to do that, one might try to see how the extant model-theoretic or proof-theoretic proofs can be adapted to such languages. Here is the specification of this first-order language L 1 :
Individual variables: a, b, c, …, x, y, z
Propositional variables: p, q, r,…
Propositional constants: t, f
Predicate variables p (k) of k arguments for k ≥ 1; where there is no ambiguity, we will drop the superscripts on these variables.
Predicate constants t (k) of k arguments for each k ≥ 1.
There is for each k a k+1-ary function symbol App k for application of a kary predicate variable p (k) to a k-termed sequence of individual variables
The terms are the variables and constants of each sort, as well as the terms as arguments where p i is k i -ary, to a term Q(p 1 ,…,p n ) of propositional sort.
For any term π of propositional sort, whether in the base language or this extension, we write T(p) for p = t, to express that p is true.
The following is a base set S of axioms for L 1 :
The last of these is of course just Extensionality for predicates. We define the translation of each formula A of the 2 nd order language L 2 , with or without Q, into a formula A↓ of the 1 st order language L 1 by simply replacing each atomic formula τ of A (i.e. each propositional term)
by T(τ). Thus the translation of the above formula characterizing the axiom and rule for universal quantification is simply
Similarly, we obtain an inverse translation from any 1 st order formula B of L 1 into a 2 nd order formula B↑ of L 2 by simply removing each occurrence of 'T' that is applied to propositional terms. The atomic formulas π 1 = π 2 are first replaced by π 1 ↔ π 2 . These translations are inverse to each other (up to provable equivalence) and the semantical relationship between the two is given by the following lemma, whose proof is quite simple.
above. Then (i) if A is a formula of L 2 and σ is an assignment to its free variables in
Moreover, the same equivalences hold under the adjunction of Q and its interpretations throughout.
Now to prove the main theorem of the text, suppose A(Q) is a sentence of L 2 (Q) such that over each model M 2 , Q U is the unique operation restricted to the predicates of M 2 that satisfies A(Q). Then it is also the unique operation that satisfies A(Q)↓ in M 1 . So now by the completeness theorem for many-sorted first-order logic, we have provability of
in FOL, so that by Beth's definability theorem, which follows from the interpolation theorem for many-sorted logic (Feferman 1968a) , the relation Q(p 1 ,…,p n ) = t is equivalent to a formula B(p 1 ,…,p n ) of L 1 . Moreover, by assumption, in each model M 1 , B defines the relation Q U restricted to the range of its predicate variables (considered as relations). Though B is a formula of L 1 , it is not necessarily first-order in the usual sense since it may still contain quantified propositional and predicate variables; the remainder of the proof is devoted to showing how those may be eliminated.
First of all, we can replace any quantified propositional variable p in B by its instances t and f, so we need only eliminate the predicate variables. Lifting B to B↑ and M 1 to the corresponding M 2 gives, finally, the desired result.
Question. It is shown in Feferman (1968a Feferman ( , 1968b For Q to be considered as a logical constant, its'meaning' must be completely contained in these axioms and inference rules.
In other words, it is quite inadequate to propose a quantifier Q for incorporation in the calculus as a logical constant, by giving its meaning in set theory, say (e.g., "there exist uncountably many"), and also axioms which are merely consistent with this meaning. The meaning of Q must be completely determined by the axioms (and rules) for it: they must carry the whole weight of the meaning, so to speak; the meaning must not be imposed from outside (by, e.g., a set-theoretical definition), for then we merely have a 'mathematical' or 'set-theoretical' quantifier, not a logical one. … Our basic assumption, then, gives a necessary condition for a proposed new constant to be considered as purely logical. We re-state it as a principle of implicit definability:
(ID) A logical constant must be defined implicitly by its axioms and inference rules.
Hence in order to prove the adequacy of S c , it will be sufficient to show that any constant which is implicitly definable (by its axioms and rules) is also explicitly definable from S c ." (Zucker 1978, pp. 518-519) There follow three notes (ibid.). The first is that (ID) is only proposed as a necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) condition for logicality. The second is that the inference rules for the new constant need not be of the natural deduction kind. Third, it is assumed that the status of the members of S c as logical constants is not in doubt.
As noted in the introductory discussion above, one essential difference I have with Zucker is that I regard the meaning of Q to be provided from the outside, so to speak, i.e., to be given in model theoretic terms prior to the consideration of any rules of inference that may be in accord with it. For me, the significance of the condition ID is to specify completely the role of Q as an inferential agent.
Returning to Zucker's sketched proof of the adequacy of S c to any Q given by the implicit definability condition (ID) (on pp. 526ff), he assumes that the type level 2 operation Q is axiomatized by a finite set ∑ of schemata A(Q, 
